<p class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content="Just 16 months ago, Zoom Video (NASDAQ: ZM) was valued at $1 billion. When trading ended on April 23 of this year, that valuation had increased 18-fold! It was closing in on $20 billion!” data-reactid=”11″>Just 16 months ago, Zoom Video (NASDAQ: ZM) was valued at $1 billion. When trading ended on April 23 of this year, that valuation had increased 18-fold! It was closing in on $20 billion!
<p class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content="Let's put that into perspective. Zoom is a recent IPO. If it had been public the whole time, that would equate to the stock increasing 20% every month. And here’s the real kicker: This isn’t just market insanity. Zoom is a high-quality company. How high quality? Let’s investigate.” data-reactid=”12″>Let’s put that into perspective. Zoom is a recent IPO. If it had been public the whole time, that would equate to the stock increasing 20% every month. And here’s the real kicker: This isn’t just market insanity. Zoom is a high-quality company. How high quality? Let’s investigate.
Image source: Getty Images.
<p class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content="As an investor, I almost never quibble about valuation when three things are present: financial fortitude, management with skin in the game, and a business that combines optionality (I’ll explain what that means below) with a wide moat.” data-reactid=”25″>As an investor, I almost never quibble about valuation when three things are present: financial fortitude, management with skin in the game, and a business that combines optionality (I’ll explain what that means below) with a wide moat.
<h2 class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content="Financial fortitude” data-reactid=”26″>Financial fortitude
<p class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content="After raising money in its IPO, Zoom is on solid financial footing. The company could have as much as $524 million in cash and investments after the offering versus absolutely no long-term debt.” data-reactid=”27″>After raising money in its IPO, Zoom is on solid financial footing. The company could have as much as $524 million in cash and investments after the offering versus absolutely no long-term debt.
<p class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content="Additionally, the company actually brought in $23 million in free cash flow last year. That's not usually the case with smaller, fast-growing, software-as-a-service (SaaS) companies.” data-reactid=”28″>Additionally, the company actually brought in $23 million in free cash flow last year. That’s not usually the case with smaller, fast-growing, software-as-a-service (SaaS) companies.
Both of these facts — a sizable war chest and positive cash flows — mean Zoom has lots of flexibility. Should an economic downturn occur, it would be on solid financial footing. And no matter the economic climate, it has flexibility to take advantage of opportunities when they arise.
<h2 class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content="Skin in the game” data-reactid=”30″>Skin in the game
I love investing in founder-led companies — especially when management has lots of skin in the game and a workforce that raves about their employer.
Founders often view their companies as representations of their life’s work, and they are intrinsically motivated to build something of lasting value. When their management team is also financially motivated via share ownership to create value, that doesn’t hurt.
On all three of these points, Zoom qualifies as a company at which there’s lots of skin in the game:
- Eric Yuan founded the company in 2011 and still serves as CEO.
- Insiders, combined, control approximately 35% of voting power, with Yuan holding roughly 20% of both Class A and Class B shares.
- Employees give Zoom 4.8 stars (out of 5.0) on Glassdoor.com, with Yuan earning a 97% approval rating.
In short, when the people making things happen at Zoom “win,” then shareholders — via stock-price appreciation — will win, too.
<h2 class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content="Barbell technique” data-reactid=”39″>Barbell technique
<p class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content="Finally, we have the barbell technique. This is an idea first introduced to me by the works of Nassim Taleb. The idea is simple: A company should devote about 85% of its time and resources to reliable revenue streams protected by a wide moat. With the other 15%, it should pursue high-risk, high-reward opportunities.” data-reactid=”40″>Finally, we have the barbell technique. This is an idea first introduced to me by the works of Nassim Taleb. The idea is simple: A company should devote about 85% of its time and resources to reliable revenue streams protected by a wide moat. With the other 15%, it should pursue high-risk, high-reward opportunities.
This way, the damage from those opportunities not panning out is minimal — while the benefits of success are outsized. In effect, this is what the aforementioned “optionality” means: multiple ways to grow the business in fulfilling the company’s ultimate mission.
<p class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content="There's no better way to measure the success of Zoom's barbell technique than its net dollar expansion rate (NDER). This tallies all the customers that paid subscription revenue in Year One and compares it to how much the same cohort paid in Year Two. By filtering out the role of new customers, we can see:” data-reactid=”42″>There’s no better way to measure the success of Zoom’s barbell technique than its net dollar expansion rate (NDER). This tallies all the customers that paid subscription revenue in Year One and compares it to how much the same cohort paid in Year Two. By filtering out the role of new customers, we can see:
- If customers stay with Zoom over time — which is likely thanks to high switching costs. When this is true, NDER should be near 100%.
- If there’s optionality, with customers paying more year after year. If this is the case, NDER should be well above 100%.
Zoom only started reporting NDER three quarters ago, but it has clocked in at more than 138% every quarter, representing a very well-functioning barbell technique.
<h2 class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content="Insane valuation: An exception to my rule” data-reactid=”47″>Insane valuation: An exception to my rule
<p class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content="So, given that I'm willing to invest in just about anything growing this fast, what’s my problem?” data-reactid=”48″>So, given that I’m willing to invest in just about anything growing this fast, what’s my problem?
- Zoom’s price-to-free-cash-flow (P/FCF) stood at 782.
- Zoom’s price-to-earnings (based on net income of $7.6 million last year) stood at 2,368.
But, it could reasonably be argued, those two numbers are misleadingly high, as the company has only just started to become profitable/free-cash-flow positive. Even small improvements in either metric would quickly change these ratios.
That’s a fair point. So let’s look at Zoom versus some of the other “high-priced” SaaS stocks that I own. These five — obviously not including Zoom — make up one-quarter of my real-life portfolio.
| Company | Price-to-Sales Ratio |
|---|---|
| Zoom Video | 69 |
| MongoDB | 27 |
| Veeva Systems | 24 |
| Shopify | 22 |
| Paycom | 20 |
| Zendesk | 15 |
Data source: YCharts. All data accurate as of market close April 23, 2019.
<p class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content="To put this in plain English: Many investors already consider these high-flying SaaS stocks to be expensive. Zoom is between two and a half and three times more expensive than they are!” data-reactid=”62″>To put this in plain English: Many investors already consider these high-flying SaaS stocks to be expensive. Zoom is between two and a half and three times more expensive than they are!
<p class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content="This makes me think investors getting in now might find themselves in a position similar to those who bought Microsoft back in 2000.” data-reactid=”63″>This makes me think investors getting in now might find themselves in a position similar to those who bought Microsoft back in 2000.
- Between January 2000 and January 2015, Microsoft the company did well. Sales quadrupled while earnings per share jumped 240%.
- Over the same time frame, Microsoft the stock did not do well — returning a grand total of just 11% for investors. And that’s including dividends!
Why is there such a divide? Because Microsoft was selling for almost 32 times sales back then. Today, it sits at around 8.5 times sales. You can do the math.
<p class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content="And so I think investors who like Zoom would be better off waiting for better value points. At the very least, if you feel you must own some, I suggest buying a small starter position and adding to it as time goes on. And, as I’m predicting, the stock should give you better and better entry points.” data-reactid=”68″>And so I think investors who like Zoom would be better off waiting for better value points. At the very least, if you feel you must own some, I suggest buying a small starter position and adding to it as time goes on. And, as I’m predicting, the stock should give you better and better entry points.
<p class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content=" More From The Motley Fool ” data-reactid=”69″> More From The Motley Fool
<p class="canvas-atom canvas-text Mb(1.0em) Mb(0)–sm Mt(0.8em)–sm" type="text" content="Teresa Kersten, an employee of LinkedIn, a Microsoft subsidiary, is a member of The Motley Fool’s board of directors. Brian Stoffel owns shares of MongoDB, Paycom Software, Shopify, Veeva Systems, and Zendesk. The Motley Fool owns shares of and recommends Microsoft, MongoDB, Paycom Software, Shopify, Veeva Systems, and Zendesk. The Motley Fool has a disclosure policy.” data-reactid=”77″>Teresa Kersten, an employee of LinkedIn, a Microsoft subsidiary, is a member of The Motley Fool’s board of directors. Brian Stoffel owns shares of MongoDB, Paycom Software, Shopify, Veeva Systems, and Zendesk. The Motley Fool owns shares of and recommends Microsoft, MongoDB, Paycom Software, Shopify, Veeva Systems, and Zendesk. The Motley Fool has a disclosure policy.
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